Table of Contents

Spis treści
Introduction
Poland and Hungary: a long-and short-term economic comparison
As a point of departure, it is instructive to clarify how Hungary performed in terms of real economic convergence since the early years of economic transformation -as compared to other countries of CEEU, in particular relative to
Poland. Figure 1 shows the average growth rate of real per capita GDP between 1994 and 2015 in relation to the (log of) per capita GDP, measured at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in 1993. As shown by the regression line, there is a negative relationship between the level of "initial" income and its real growth rate within the EU, which is an indication of longer-term real economic ("beta") convergence among member states. However, some of the countries underperformed, while others performed better, relative to the potential stemming from being simply underdeveloped. True, as attested by the narrowing spread over German bond yields, Hungary is considered to have made significant progress since 2012. Still, its spread was 3 percentage points above the yields of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in early 2016, in spite of the huge adjustments in its external and internal imbalances. The markets' skepticism (in line with that of the credit-rating agencies -see Figure A8 ) is related to uncertainties regarding the future conduct of macroeconomic policy, and -no less importantly -sectoral policies. 4 What sort of new discriminatory levies and/or regulations is the government contemplating? What markets and properties does the government intend to capture in the future? These uncertainties appear to outweigh the government's efforts to cut public deficits. In the following sections I turn to a more systematic discussion of macroeconomic developments and economic policy in Hungary since 2010. To begin, I review the main characteristics and drivers of the country's economic development.
Characteristics and drivers of Hungary's recent economic performance
Characteristics
None of the recent macroeconomic developments in Hungary can be characterized as simply being either negative or positive. Nor is it easy to identify the exogenous vs. endogenous factors behind Hungary's recent performance. In spite of the difficulties, in the following section I first review a checklist of the bright and gloomy aspects of Hungary's performance. This is followed by the examination of exogenous (non-policy-related) and endogenous (policy-related) factors behind the country's recent macroeconomic performance. • GDP and employment grew in 2014-15, but GDP growth was mainly due to the deployment of EU funds • Driven by EU funds / Napędzany przez fundusze unijne • Public works, work abroad, low productivity / Roboty publiczne, praca zagranicą, niska wydajność pracy
• Consolidating the fiscal balance and decline in the public debt/GDP ratio / Uzdrowienie finansów publicznych i spadek wskaźnika długu publicznego do PKB
• Special/sectoral taxes; nationalization of private pensions / Specjalne podatki branżowe; nacjonalizacja prywatnych funduszy emerytalnych
• External surplus, drop in net foreign debt / Nadwyżka w obrotach bieżących, spadek długu zagranicznego netto • The fiscal balance improved and the public debt to GDP ratio decreased. However, a large part of public revenues stems from special (sectoral) taxes, hindering private investments. The public debt ratio should have decreased much more significantly, as the government seized private pension savings amounting to almost 10% of GDP.
• The external balance shows an increasing surplus, and net foreign liabilities have been decreasing. However, the surplus is partly due to savings by the corporate sector, which is a reflection of the low investment activity.
• Household incomes have started to grow, but this has been accompanied by an increase in income inequality and relatively mild growth in household consumption.
• Since 2011 investments have been increasing steadily, but this is due to public investments, financed by EU funds. In real terms, private investments were lower in 2015 than in 2010.
• Inflation and interest rates are at historically low levels. However, this is mainly due to external factors (the fall in energy prices) and politically motivated cuts in the prices of public services.
• There is one aspect of Hungary's recent economic development that is purely negative, lacking any positive side: the significant deterioration in the economy's institutional environment. These developments are discussed in section 4.5, in comparison with Poland.
Drivers
In this section I review the exogenous (non-policy related)
and endogenous (policy-related) factors behind macroeconomic developments in Hungary since 2010. I group these factors according to whether they had a positive or a negative impact on Hungary's macroeconomic performance.
• Poprawiła się równowaga fiskalna i zmniejszył wskaź-nik długu publicznego do PKB. Spora część dochodów budżetowych pochodzi jednak ze specjalnych (sektorowych) podatków, które hamują inwestycje prywatne.
Wskaźnik długu publicznego powinien spaść znacznie mocniej, gdyż rząd przejął oszczędności zgromadzone w prywatnych funduszach emerytalnych, które stanowiły prawie 10% PKB.
• Bilans obrotów bieżących pokazuje rosnącą nadwyżkę, a zobowiązania zagraniczne netto spadają. Jednakże nadwyżka jest po części wynikiem oszczędności sektora przedsiębiorstw, co odzwierciedla niską aktywność inwestycyjną tego sektora.
• Dochody gospodarstw domowych zaczęły rosnąć, ale temu zjawisku towarzyszy wzrost nierówności dochodowych i stosunkowo łagodny wzrost konsumpcji gospodarstw domowych.
• Od 2011 roku inwestycje stopniowo rosną, ale głów-nie za sprawą inwestycji publicznych finansowanych ze środków unijnych. W ujęciu realnym poziom inwestycji prywatnych był w 2015 roku niższy niż w roku 2010.
• Inflacja i stopy procentowe są na historycznie najniż-szych poziomach. Wynika to jednak głównie z czynników zewnętrznych (spadek cen energii) i politycznie motywowanych obniżek cen usług sektora użyteczno-ści publicznej.
• Istnieje aspekt zmiany sytuacji gospodarczej na Wę-grzech w ostatnich latach, który ma wydźwięk wyłącznie negatywny i w którym trudno doszukać się jakichkolwiek pozytywów: znaczne pogorszenie instytucjonalnego otoczenia gospodarki. Te zmiany omawiane są w części 3.5, a za punkt odniesienia przyjmuję Polskę. • The international financial environment was extremely favorable: capital markets were liquid and interest rates were exceptionally low.
Determinanty
• During 2014 and 2015 Hungary achieved significant gains in its terms of trade (0.5% and 1% of GDP respectively), mainly due to the drop in energy prices.
• The government inherited essential agreements on FDI inflows (in particular the investment by Mercedes).
• • Nadzwyczaj sprzyjająca była sytuacja na międzynaro-dowych rynkach finansowych: rynki kapitałowe były płynne, a stopy procentowe wyjątkowo niskie.
• W latach 2014-2015 Węgry osiągnęły znaczną poprawę terms of trade (odpowiednio 0.5% i 1% PKB), głów-nie za sprawą spadku cen energii.
• Rząd odziedziczył kluczowe umowy z inwestorami zagranicznymi (zwłaszcza projekt inwestycyjny Mercedesa).
• 
Policy-related (endogenous) factors
Positive
• Consolidation of the fiscal balance.
• Conversion of FX debts into domestic currency debts (this may give a boost to private consumption in the next few years).
• The National Bank has cautiously cut interest rates as far as possible.
Negative
• The introduction of a flat income tax and the removal of tax credits for low wage earners: This had a clearly negative effect on the income of poor households.
• Special/sectoral taxes on services, in particular on the financial sector. These measures hindered investment in the service sector. The levies on the financial sector constrained credit growth.
• As mentioned, there was a major deterioration in the institutional environment, e.g. undermining property rights and introducing retroactive legislation, which involved an increased perception of policy instability and uncertainty and, in particular, a significant increase in perceived corruption.
• The "freedom fight" against the IMF and the EU -designed for domestic political proposes -combined with an "opening to the East" has proven to be a failure. The "fight" resulted in external conflicts that the government could not win, while the conflict with the IMF was made up for communication purposes. The "opening to the East" had no results whatsoever in terms of increasing trade.
On Hungary's "unorthodox" economic policy
Since a part of the international audience is willing to accept the Hungarian government's claim that the recent acceleration in economic growth proves the success of its unorthodox economic policy, it is worth taking a brief
Czynniki endogeniczne
Pozytywne
• Konsolidacja finansów publicznych.
• Konwersja zadłużenia w walutach zagranicznych na dług w walucie krajowej (może to pobudzić konsumpcję prywatną w najbliższych latach).
• Bank centralny ostrożnie obniżał stopy procentowe na tyle, na ile było to możliwe.
Negatywne
• Wprowadzenie podatku liniowego i likwidacja ulg podatkowych dla najmniej zarabiających. Miało to zdecydowanie negatywny wpływ na dochody uboższych gospodarstw domowych.
• Specjalne podatki sektorowe na usługi, zwłaszcza na usługi finansowe. Te działania zahamowały inwestycje w sektorze usług. Dodatkowe obciążenia podatkowe w sektorze usług finansowych ograniczyły wzrost akcji kredytowej.
• Jak już wspomniałem, nastąpiło znaczne pogorszenie otoczenia instytucjonalnego, na przykład podważono prawa własności oraz wprowadzono legislację z mocą wsteczną. Wywołało to poczucie braku stabilności polityki i niepewność, a zwłaszcza znaczny wzrost percepcji korupcji.
• "Wojna o wolność" prowadzona z MFW i UE -kreowana na potrzeby polityki wewnętrznej -w połączeniu z "otwarciem na Wschód" okazała się porażką. "Wojna" ta doprowadziła to konfliktów zewnętrznych, których rząd nie był w stanie wygrać (podczas gdy konflikt z MFW został stworzony dla potrzeb propagandowych). "Otwarcie na Wschód" nie przyniosło jakichkolwiek rezultatów jeśli chodzi o zwiększenie wymiany handlowej.
O "nieortodoksyjnej" polityce gospodarczej Węgier
Ponieważ pewna część społeczności międzynarodowej jest gotowa zaakceptować twierdzenie rządu węgierskie- What may appear to be unorthodox is the expressly offensive rhetoric against service industries (in particular, financial services), accompanied by the introduction of heavy discriminatory levies (sectoral taxes) on these activities (retail chains, telecommunications and the energy sector). The underlying ideology, however, is extremely orthodox: it stems from the Marxist approach to distinguishing between "productive" and "unproductive" activities.
What is actually happening under the rubric of so-called unorthodox policies is a massive nationalization on the one hand (orthodox Marxism), and a large-scale redistribution of properties and markets on the other. 4 The latter spodarcza odnosi sukces, warto przyjrzeć się temu, co ta polityka w rzeczywistości oznacza i jakie działania zawiera. 
Some key issues and aspects of Hungary's recent economic performance
In the following, without attempting to be exhaustive, I discuss five points that I consider important for understanding recent developments in the Hungarian economy. Several other important aspects of Hungary's macroeconomic developments -the increasing external surplus, the decreasing government deficit and the fall in net foreign debt -are highlighted by the charts in the Appendix.
Early expectations vs. results
In 2010 the new government had very high expectations regarding the medium-term positive effects of its "unorthodox" policies. As a result of the introduction of the flat income tax, a significant increase in GDP, household consumption and gross capital formation was anticipated. These developments help us understand the sluggish growth in consumption: incomes were redistributed from that part of the population which has the largest propensity to consume, to those whose propensity is the lowest.
Employment
A further factor affecting consumption is the number of / Na Węgrzech (bez prac publicznych)
Investments
The government considers the increase in investments to be a further indication of the success of its policy. This claim corresponds to the facts only in the sense that the increase in investments over the past five years is the result of public investments.
The two panes of Figure 8 14 allows us to compare overall ranks and their changes (the weighted outcome of all factors) with those results that are related to institutions themselves. . Regarding the quality of institutions, Hungary's position deteriorated to a greater extent than its overall ranking or the ranking of Poland (see the next four bars). The next five indictors reveal positions of (and changes in) some fundamental aspects of institutional quality. As it turns out, Hungary experienced the steepest decline in terms of the perception of protection of property rights -both in comparison with its former position and with that of Poland. It is not necessary to review the position of the two countries by the ranking of specific institutions one by one (the deterioration of Hungary's position in every aspect is extremely clear), but it is useful to call attention to the last four bars, indicating the transparency of government policy-making. This is the only aspect in which Hungary had a better rank than Poland in 2010, but by 2015 the positions had reversed in this respect as well. 8 
Growth prospects
In March 2016 almost all projections for the Hungarian economy estimated the country's growth potential for the next few years at about 2-2.5%, which is very low for attaining substantial long-term convergence. 9 The contribution of capital is likely to be small in comparison with Poland, while the increase in total factor productivity (TFP) is estimated to be much lower than in Slovakia. Figure 13 presents the forecasts of the European Commission, which are at the lower end of the range of 
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